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Leslie Kim Treiger
From Aristophanes through Swift and Trudeau, satire has been an im-
portant mode of expressing political and social criticism.' Satire is a liter-
ary form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to de-
ride prevailing vices or follies.' It is particularly well-suited for political
critique "because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and un-
masks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to
have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed."' As early as 1917,
one form of satire, cartoons, was identified as an effective medium for
political speech.' But while speech critical of government policies and
public figures generally is accorded complete protection under the First
Amendment5 as "political speech,"" satire, which is critical of public
figures and hence should be protected as political speech,' is not ade-
quately protected against libel claims.
Libel is governed by the "actual malice" standard established in New
1. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 881 (1988) (describing historical use of
graphic depictions and satirical cartoons, and noting that "our political discourse would have been
considerably poorer without them"); see also Yorty v. Chandler, 13 Cal. App. 3d 467, 471, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 711 (1970) ("Ever since stone-age man began to draw on the walls of his cave, caricature
has been used as a device to express opinion on matters of current interest. . . . From Daumier and
Tenniel to Low and Herblock the political cartoon has occupied a central position in the presentation
of critical comment on events and personages of the times.").
2. 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 119-20 (J. Murray, H. Bradley, W. Craigie & C. Onions
eds. 1961). The satiric form, however, has defied easy definition or characterization. PRINCETON
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND Po'ncS 738 (A. Preminger ed. 1974). See also infra notes 101-111
and accompanying text.
3. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
4. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 36 (2d Cir. 1917).
5. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The general proposition that
freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled
by our decisions.").
6. G. GuNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 972 (11th ed. 1985) (speech critical of government offi-
cials and policies is political speech).
7. This Note addresses the problem of public figures because satire is topical and addresses issues
of popular concern, see G. HIGHET, THE ANATOMY OF SATIRE 5 (1962), and thus often identifies
public figures. But not all satire of public figures is "political" in the narrow sense of the term. See,
e.g., Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 1985) (restaurant considered
public figure). "Political speech" is used here in a broader sense to mean commentary on society and
its institutions generally.
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York Times Co. v. Sullivan,8 according to which public figures9 may re-
cover only if the defendant's statement was intentionally false. Satire
works through distortion;'0 it is, by definition, intentionally false. Al-
though vulnerable to libel claims under the New York Times test, satire is
not the sort of falsehood that the doctrine was designed to deter. The New
York Times rule allows speakers to be found liable for intentionally mak-
ing false statements of fact because such statements fail to contribute to
the competition in the marketplace of ideas." But while satire presents a
face both false and factual, it is not understood in a literal sense; it is not
believed as false fact." Rather, beneath its factual face lies a critical mes-
sage, which is satire's essence. Audiences understand this essence, and
read satire as opinion rather than as literal fact.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' 3 the Supreme Court carved out an
exception to the New York Times standard that could be used to rescue
satire from its quandary. Under Gertz, opinions are protected even where
defamatory. 4 But as the opinion privilege has been interpreted by lower
courts, only very exaggerated forms of satire are clearly protected: fictions,
hyperbole, allegories, cartoons, epithets and nonsensical fantasies. 5 The
most realistic satire, 6 which is often the sharpest satire, does not fall into
any of these categories.
With no dear standard, courts have protected satires only after numer-
ous appeals, and then only by applying ad hoc, clumsy, and non-uniform
rationales.' 7 This Note argues that the opinion privilege must be under-
stood to immunize satirical critiques of public figures against libel claims,
and suggests a test to facilitate courts' assessments of realistic political sat-
8. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
9. New York Times applied to public officials, but its rule was soon extended to public figures
generally. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), interpreted in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335-37 (1974).
10. L. FEINBERG, THE SATIRIST. His TEMPERAMENT, MOTIVATION, AND INFLUENCE 7 (1965).
11. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (deliberate lie has little value as step to
truth and is at odds with orderly change and with premises of democratic government). While "there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact," some factual error is inevitable, Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 340, and must be tolerated in order to give necessary "'breathing space'" to freedoms of expres-
sion, New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (citations omitted).
Satire may be defended under the First Amendment rationale that speech should be protected to
ensure a wide range of public debate in an effort to arrive at truth, but also under the "representative
democracy" and "individual autonomy" rationales. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 978-79.
12. Reading satire requires a rejection of what the author or speaker seems to say in her surface
message. W. BOOTH, A RHETORIC OF IRONY 1, 6, 10, 24, 33 (1974).
13. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
14. 418 U.S. at 339-40. The constitutional protection for opinion has replaced the common law
"fair comment" doctrine which privileged the expression of opinion on matters of public concern. R.
SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 164, 180-83 (1980).
15. See infra notes 38-79 and accompanying text.
16. Satire aims at realism, see G. HIGHET, supra note 7, at 5, which involves mimicking reality to
the point of appearing to be a presentation of true fact. See also infra note 44 and accompanying text;
cf R. LANHAM, THE MOTIVES OF ELOQUENCE 7, 17 (1976) (rhetorical narrative and satire are
mimetic of an obverse reality).
17. See infra notes 28-83 and accompanying text.
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ire. Section I discusses the importance of giving satire aimed at public
figures absolute protection, even at the expense of reputational interests.
Section II argues that none of the current characterizations of the stan-
dard can adequately protect realistic satires from liability. In Section III,
this Note develops a standard for a "satire category" of the opinion privi-
lege, using hermeneutics as a guide. Hermeneutics, the study of meaning,
is a helpful tool for investigating what satire means, and thus how courts
should treat it. According to many contemporary hermeneutics theorists,
the proper focus for an inquiry into the process of deriving meaning is on
the reader's understanding of the material rather than the author's in-
tent."8 Thus, liability should be imposed not where the author intends to
falsify, but where readers believe the statement as fact rather than as
opinion.
I. SATIRE AND LIBEL: BALANCING FREE SPEECH AND REPUTATION
Libel law sanctions speech that is defamatory-speech that "tends to
expose [one] 'to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce
an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to de-
prive him of their friendly intercourse in society.' "'s The doctrine has
been developed in order to protect individuals' interest in reputation.20
Libel law often comes into conflict, however, with the First Amendment's
protection of free speech. In these situations, courts have recognized the
need to weigh the plaintiff's interest in reputation against the defendant's
First Amendment right, but have held that the right to speak critically of
public figures must prevail.
21
In upholding the speaker's First Amendment right, courts have dis-
cussed a number of factors. First, courts have emphasized the importance
18. Legal scholars have applied hermeneutics to evaluate theories of constitutional interpretation
or law's interpretive methods generally. See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985);
Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. Rav. 373 (1982). Some of these theorists have argued
for looking to the interpretation of the reader, or community as a whole, to find the meaning of a text.
See, e.g., S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); see also infra notes 87-89
and accompanying text. This Note approaches a specific legal doctrine with similar hermeneutic tools,
and explores the implications.
Hermeneutics is particularly useful as applied to the tort of libel, which involves communication. A
concern about reputation is a concern about the community's perception of an individual member of
that group. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. Hermeneutics can aid the law by identifying the
meaning that satire has for its community of readers.
19. Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., 119 A.D.2d 252, 255, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869, 871 (1986)
(quoting Sydney v. Macfadden Newspaper Publishing Co., 242 N.Y. 208, 211-12, 151 N.E. 209, 210
(1926)).
20. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
21. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (where "scales are in
such an uncertain balance" as to whether allegedly defamatory statement is true or false, "the Consti-
tution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech"). Of course, the protection is not
absolute; speakers may be held liable where constitutional boundaries have been transgressed. See
infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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of vigorous public debate.22 Without clear safeguards, this vital discourse
may be chilled by the threat of a lawsuit. Such self-censorship by potential
defendants is a very real burden; courts and commentators have stressed
the need to make writers less fearful of libel suits.2"
Second, public figures are said to have assumed the risk of being at-
tacked by voluntarily entering public life.2" The individual who thrusts
herself into the public eye must be prepared to face some abuse.25 A third
argument courts have offered for preferring speakers' rights to plaintiffs'
reputational interests is that public figures have means of "self help":
Public figures can use the media to combat reputational harm. Private
figures, by contrast, do not enjoy access to the media to the same extent.26
For these reasons, courts have developed a doctrine that protects true
fact and opinion-even where defamatory2 7-from libel claims. The ap-
propriate threshold question for satire therefore is not whether it is true
fact or defamatory but whether it is protected opinion.
II. THE CURRENT STANDARD
A. The New York Times Rule
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,28 the Supreme Court established a
three-part test to protect critics of official conduct from libel suits. To
establish a claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant published (1)
a false statement of fact (2) having defamatory content with (3) "actual
malice," defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth.29 Because satire works through distortion of the familiar-while at
the same time pretending to depict reality-in order to level criticism,30 it
fails to gain protection under any of the three prongs of this standard.
First, because it works through distortion, satiric material easily can be
identified as falsity or, at best, exaggeration. Moreover, by definition sat-
ire often, on its face, has the appearance of fact. Second, satirical material
22. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (describing national commit-
ment to maintaining "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate).
23. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); id. at 365-66 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Gora, Introduction: Literature, Life, and the Law, in Symposium: Defamation in Fic-
tion, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 225, 230 (1985).
24. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
25. As President Harry Truman put it: "If you can't stand the heat, don't go in the kitchen."
Silsdorf v. Levine, 85 A.D.2d 297, 302, 447 N.Y.S.2d 936, 939 (1982); see also Ollman v. Evans, 750
F.2d 970, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring) (individual deliberately entering
arena where ideas about politics contend must expect rough and personal debate), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985).
26. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
27. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
285 n.10 (1974) (true facts can create reputational harm, but are nonetheless protected); Gertz, 418
U.S. at 339-40 (although opinions can damage reputations, they are nonetheless protected).
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. Id. at 271-72 (false fact); id. at 272-73 (defamatory); id. at 279-80 (actual malice).
30. L. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 7.
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is critical of its subject's character or actions, and hence may be defama-
tory. Finally, the satirist always writes with "actual malice," since she
intends the falsity or exaggeration of her statement.
Realistic satire, which is most vulnerable to liability under this stan-
dard, was at issue in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.31 In that case, Rever-
end Jerry Falwell brought suit against Larry Flynt and Hustler Maga-
zine for a parody based on the "first time" slogan used in Campari
Liquor advertisements. In the Hustler version, which was printed in the
format of an interview, Falwell's "first time" was an incestuous encounter
with his mother in an outhouse in Lynchburg, Virginia.3 2 The piece was
clearly recognizable as satire: It distorted the familiar (the well-known
Reverend was depicted as sexually perverse) with the pretence of reality
(in the interview format) to convey an underlying critical message (that
Falwell is a hypocrite). Although this satire was a critical statement about
a public figure33 and hence should have been protected as political speech
expressed through opinion, it engendered a complicated libel suit; there
was no clear way to protect the speech because of its satirical form.
Falwell argued that the piece was intentionally false, seemingly factual
and defamatory,34 and thus violated the New York Times rule. The jury in
the district court dismissed the libel claim not on the basis of the New
York Times test nor on a finding that the parody was protected opinion,
but simply on the grounds of its unbelievability.35 A "believability" test
offers weak protection for realistic satire, which is often believable in the
sense that it is not impossible fantasy, but nonetheless is not actually be-
lieved.36 The Supreme Court's decision in Hustler overturned the large
sum in damages awarded by the jury to Falwell for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress," but did little to resolve the underlying
ambiguity.
While satire violates the New York Times actual malice test, another
form of literary falsehood, fiction, generally has found protection under
the standard. 8 Fiction, defined broadly, is "fabrication" or "invention of
31. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
32. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, Nov. 1983, at 2 (inside front cover), reprinted in Brief for Respondent
at Appendix E, Hustler Magazine and Flynt v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988) (No. 86-1278). The
disclaimer "ad parody-not to be taken seriously" was printed at the bottom of the page.
33. The parties did not dispute the fact that Falwell was a public figure. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at
882 & n.5.
34. Brief for Respondent, supra note 32, at 24-29, 33-35.
35. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). See infra note 70.
36. The believability standard presents numerous other problems as well. See infra notes 65-72
and accompanying text.
37. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 882. On appeal, the Court extended the stringent New York Times libel
standard to this alternative tort. The New York Times standard is as problematic for satire under this
tort as it is for libel: The satirist often sharpens her spear and aims to distress quite intentionally. See
infra note 114.
38. On the problems of fiction under libel law, see R. SACK, supra note 14, at 66, 238, 247;
Symposium, supra note 23.
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the imagination."3'9 Satire can be viewed as a subset of fiction-as one
kind of fabrication. Fiction and satire both face liability under libel law
because they are intentionally false40 and attempt to convey their falsity in
a believable fashion, although they are not generally believed by readers.
Fiction has gained protection for a different reason, however. The fic-
tion writer usually does not intend to identify and defame publicly-known
individuals"' in the same way that the satirist does. As a result, fiction
generally escapes liability by not meeting the "of and concerning" re-
quirement of the actual malice rule,42 according to which a speaker may
not be found liable unless her statement identifiably concerns the plaintiff,
or it is at least shown that she intended such an identification. 43 Most
satire, intentionally poking fun at real people, real issues and real
events," could not be protected by the "of and concerning" defense. 5
B. The Opinion Privilege
The opinion privilege grew out of the New York Times requirement
that only false statements about public figures can give rise to libel claims.
The Supreme Court reasoned in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that state-
ments of opinion are protected from defamation suits by the First Amend-
ment because, unlike statements of fact, they can never be false: "Under
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."'46
39. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 111.
40. Fiction is "false" in the sense that it is invention and not literally true; at the same time, it is
like satire in not purporting to be true in a literal sense.
41. See R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 324 (1988) (litera-
ture uses private figures).
42. For a discussion of the "of and concerning" requirement, see Note, Libel and Fiction, 92
YALE L.J. 520 (1983).
43. See, e.g., Miss America Pageant v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (D.N.J.
1981) (protecting parody of Miss America contest on basis of finding that defendant had not intended
story to resemble real person or event; rejecting defendant's contention that work should receive pro-
tection as humor, satire or opinion). Fiction, however, has not been awarded absolute protection. Id.
at 1281. In one unusual case, a court found that a fictional work was "of and concerning" the plain-
tiff, and imposed liability. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 984 (1979).
44. Worcester, The Satiric Spectrum, in SATIRE: MODERN ESSAYS IN CRITIcISM 318 (R. Paul-
son ed. 1971) (satire distinguished from comedy by presence of "the historically authentic and the
historically particular").
45. In hearing a libel suit based on a magazine's satiric comment about Jimmy Myers, a televi-
sion sports announcer, the court in Myers v. Boston Magazine Co. recognized the crucial difference
between these two literary forms: "[flnsofar as it appears on its face to be a statement of fact, the
ironic statement here resembles an assertion in a fictional narrative. . . .On the other hand, the
Boston Magazine statement differs from one in a short story or novel: it purports to be about the real
Jimmy Myers." Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 344 n.8, 403 N.E.2d 376, 381 n.8
(1980).
46. 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best test of truth is ...in the competition of the market").
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Although this language is only dictum,"' federal courts have treated it as
controlling48 and have exempted statements of opinion from liability
under libel claims. Beyond establishing the legal distinction between fact
and opinion, however, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance in
determining when statements fall into one category or the other. In grap-
pling with the problem, lower courts have developed a number of inter-
pretations of the opinion privilege. While each may provide protection for
certain satiric forms, none is adequate to protect realistic political satire.
1. Ollman v. Evans: The Totality of Circumstances Test
In Olman v. Evans,"9 a plurality of the D.C. Circuit developed the
"totality of circumstances test" for distinguishing between fact and opin-
ion.50 The court examined three elements: the verifiability of the state-
ment; the common usage or meaning of the specific language; and the
context, in terms of both the surrounding language and the setting.
In Mr. Chow v. Ste. jour Azur S.A.," the Second Circuit relied on the
first prong of the Ollman test to evaluate derogatory statements in a re-
view about the food in a Chinese restaurant,52 and held all but one com-
ment to be protected opinion. 53 The court found that because of their hy-
perbolic style, the statements could not be taken literally and hence were
not verifiable-they were incapable of being proved true or false." But
realistic satire, which presents itself in factual, literal form, is often verifi-
47. The Supreme Court's holding in Gertz, that private figures need not be held to the actual
malice standard required of public figure claimants, did not depend on an application of the fact-
opinion distinction. 418 U.S. at 347.
48. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (listing decisions
of various circuits treating Gertz dictum as controlling law), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
49. 750 F.2d at 979. The Olman litigation developed out of a newspaper column by Rowland
Evans and Robert Novak which termed a professor a "Marxist." The court held that this and other
statements were entitled to absolute First Amendment protection as expressions of opinion.
50. The Olman court relied, see id. at 977 & n.12, 982, on the holding of Information Control v.
Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980) (in determining whether statement
is fact or opinion, courts should "examine the statement in its totality in the context in which it was
uttered or published": all words used, any cautionary terms, and all circumstances surrounding state-
ment, including medium used and audience addressed).
51. 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985).
52. The statements included: "the green peppers. . . remained still frozen on the plate" and the
"pancakes [were] the thickness of a finger." Id. at 221-22.
53. The one statement that the court held to be defamatory fact involved a numerical reference,
and hence was easily verifiable: "[T]he Peking lacquered duck . . . was made up of only one dish
(instead of the three traditional ones)." Id. at 222, 229.
54. Id. at 229; see also Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976) (phrase "'fellow traveler'
of 'fascism'" protected because open to many interpretations and unverifiable), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977).
The verifiability factor grows directly out of the Gertz rationale. Opinion is protected because it
cannot be false; a statement therefore should be protected if it cannot be understood as true or false.
See Olman, 750 F.2d at 981 ("a reader cannot rationally view an unverifiable statement as conveying
actual facts"). One commentator suggests that the verifiability standard best serves the purposes of the
First Amendment and is the most predictable and easily administered test for distinguishing between
fact and opinion. Note, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REv. 1001, 1029-31, 1045 (1986).
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able and easily proven false. For example, such a test would indict the
seemingly literal satire in question in Hustler as false, verifiable fact,
since Reverend Falwell probably has not committed incest with his
mother in an outhouse.
With regard to the next factor of its test, the common usage and mean-
ing of the language, the Olman court questioned whether the statement
in dispute had a precise core of meaning or was indefinite. The D.C.
Circuit explained that "[r]eaders are . . . less likely to infer facts from an
indefinite or ambiguous statement than one with a commonly understood
meaning. ' 55 This approach safeguarded the allegoric and symbolic paint-
ing "The Mugging of the Muse," allegedly depicting the plaintiffs as
muggers, which was the subject of a libel suit in Silberman v. Georges.56
The realistic satire at issue in Hustler, however, used precise words with
clear meaning; because the language was not obviously symbolic, Hustler
would have been found liable under this test.
The final element of the Olman test, consideration of context,57 has
been used by a number of courts to protect satirical cartoons. The form of
cartoons, often comic strips, and their setting, in obviously humorous or
fantastical works, makes it clear that their statements cannot be taken lit-
erally as statements of fact, and thus are not considered libelous.5 8 Realis-
tic satire cannot be protected under this interpretation of the opinion rule.
In Hustler, the form of the parody was an interview, and the setting was
a magazine that included factual reporting.
2. Rhetorical Hyperbole
Using an approach distinct from the Ollman test-but also looking
closely at the language of the text and the context of statements-courts
have identified expressions in the form of "rhetorical hyperbole" as pro-
tected opinion."9 This category was developed in Greenbelt Cooperative
Publishing Association v. Bresler to protect the use of the term "black-
55. 750 F.2d at 979.
56. 91 A.D.2d 520, 456 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1982). The Silberman court also referred to the closely
related rhetorical hyperbole doctrine. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
57. Traditional common law tort standards recognized the importance of context. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 comment f (1977) ("inducement" explores narrative of extrinsic
circumstances, "colloquium" connects words with circumstances disclosed in inducement and "innu-
endo" interprets meaning of language in light of surrounding circumstances). In addition to the tex-
tual context of the statement, Ollman implies that the broader social context also should be examined.
750 F.2d at 983-84.
58. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1415-16 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
affld, 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989); King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2361,
2367 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986), affd in part and rev'd in part, 512 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1121 (1988).
59. According to one commentator, it is not clear whether rhetorical hyperbole is protected be-
cause it can cause no reputational harm, because it is opinion or because courts should not intervene
in something as trivial as name-calling. R. SACK, supra note 14, at 58. This Note assumes for the
discussion that protection of rhetorical hyperbole is a facet of the opinion privilege.
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mail" in the context of full and accurate reporting of a public debate. °
The doctrine also has been used to immunize the epithet "traitor,"81 the
method of allegoric representation 2 and the exaggeration used in satirical
cartoons. 63 Again, this test fails to protect satire that, in trying to be as
realistic as possible, avoids using hyperbolic language.64
3. Believability, Absurdity and Humor
Even more problematic for satire is the interpretation some courts have
given the Gertz opinion privilege as indicating that the appropriate in-
quiry is into the believability of a communication. The Silberman court,
for example, protected artwork it called "fanciful" because the art lacked
realism.65
The test developed in Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd.66 uses a
similar standard for determining not whether a statement is opinion, but
whether it is defamatory. In Pring, the court asked "whether the charged
portions in context could be reasonably understood as describing actual
facts about the plaintiff. '67 Only if the statement could be so understood
would it be subject to liability.
Pring, however, involved an "impossibility and fantasy within a fic-
tional story."68 In that case, a former "Miss Wyoming" sued the maga-
zine based on a story in which a baton-twirling Miss Wyoming was en-
gaged in sexual acts with her coach that caused him to levitate on stage
during the Miss America Pageant. While in Pring, and in other very
60. 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970).
61. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
285-86 (1974); see also Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 486 (D. Mass. 1980)
(plaintiff "runs a paper by paranoids for paranoids"); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Central
Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 228-30, 396 N.E.2d 996, 1001-02 (1979) ("inroads of commu-
nism"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
62. Silberman v. Georges, 91 A.D.2d 520, 521, 456 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397 (1982).
63. See, e.g., Keller v. Miami Herald, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1032, 1033 (S.D. Fla. 1984);
Yorty v. Chandler, 91 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715, 13 Cal. App. 3d 467, 476-77 (1970). Some courts have
combined the text-in-context interpretation of the opinion privilege with the rhetorical hyperbole cate-
gory to call cartoons opinions. See, e.g., Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. (Keller II), 778 F.2d
711, 715, 717-18 (11th Cir. 1985); Franklin v. Friedman, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1146, 1147-48
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
64. See Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 344, 403 N.E.2d 376, 380 (1980) (noting
inapplicability of rhetorical hyperbole test for language without "familiar figurative sense" or which is
not "too amorphous").
65. 91 A.D.2d at 521, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
66. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
67. Id. at 442. The RESTATEiENT, supra note 57, at § 563, uses a similar formulation in defin-
ing the meaning of a communication for libel law purposes as "that which the recipient correctly, or
mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to express" (emphasis added). Many
other courts have followed Pring or used similar language. See, e.g., Koch v. Goldway (Koch II), 817
F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 1987); Lane v. Arkansas Valley Publishing Co., 675 P.2d 747, 750 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1983); Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 340,
403 N.E.2d 376, 378-79 (1980); Moreno v. Time, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2196, 2199 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1985).
68. 695 F.2d at 441. The Pring case arose out of the same facts as Miss America Pageant v.
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981); see supra note 43.
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exaggerated forms of unbelievable fantasy, the acts depicted are physically
impossible, more realistic satire easily could be said to depict "actual
facts." Such a piece could be denied protection because it is believable,
even though it is not actually believed by its readers. Indeed, in a dissent
to the Pring decision, one judge argued that "[fjellatio is not [a fiction]. It
is a physical act, a fact, not a mental idea.""9
The lower court in Falwell v. Flynt used a test similar to the Pring
standard and successfully protected the more realistic satire; the jury
found the piece unbelievable.7 0 The test, however, poses a number of
problems. First, with reasoning following the dissent in Pring, the jury
might have found that incest is a fact, not a fiction. Second, this test allows
liability for statements with which libel law should not be concerned; no
serious reputational harm can befall the target of a satire which is plausi-
bly believable but is not actually believed as fact.
A third problem is that pursuant to the language used in Hustler and
Pring, realistic satire easily could be interpreted as describing facts,1
since satire indeed purports to do just that. Under this standard, Falwell
could argue that the parody clearly describes as fact that the Reverend
slept with his mother. The Court should have focused not on what the
author and text seem to do, but on whether the readers believed the state-
ments to be facts.
Finally, the Supreme Court's opinion in Hustler provides a weak pre-
cedent. The Court protected the parody based on the New York Times
rule, which is inappropriate for satire, and on a finding that the parody
was non-defamatory, although satire often aims to and succeeds in defam-
ing its target. Protection based on the constitutional ground of the opinion
privilege would have been much stronger.7 2 While the Supreme Court's
opinion in Hustler was hailed as a great victory for the First Amendment,
the standard it established is inadequate for protecting realistic satire.
A test equally as dangerous as a "believability" standard is measuring
the laughter inspired by the material. Some courts have set the level of
protection afforded to a work according to how funny the judge thinks it
69. 695 F.2d at 443-44 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting).
70. The district court asked the jurors whether the material could be understood as describing
actual facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which he participated. The jury responded in the
negative. Falwell v. Flynt, No. 85-1417(L) slip op. App. C, at I (W.D. Va. 1986). The Fourth
Circuit interpreted this language as a "reasonably believable" rule, 797 F.2d at 1273, 1278, and the
Supreme Court accepted the characterization, 108 S. Ct. at 882-83.
71. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 879 ("stating actual facts"); Pring, 695 F.2d at 442 ("describing actual
facts").
72. The Court repeated the Gertz dictum that there can be no "false idea," but again only as
dictum. 108 S. Ct. at 879. According to the lower court, the argument that the satire was opinion was
"irrelevant in the context of this [alternative] tort," 797 F.2d at 1276; the Supreme Court noted this
holding without explicitly rejecting it, 108 S. Ct. at 879. Justice White, in concurrence, noted that
New York Times has little to do with the case because the jury found that the advertisement contained
no statements of fact. Id. at 883. But nowhere in the opinion is the satire directly called opinion.
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is. In Frank v. National Broadcasting Co.,73 the fact that the humor of a
Saturday Night Live skit was "so extremely nonsensical and silly" was a
critical factor in the court's determination that the allegedly libelous state-
ments were protected, again not as opinion, but as non-defamatory.74 Sa-
lomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co. 75 went even further and held hu-
mor to be categorically protected. 6 Most courts, however, have rejected
this view and held that comedy is not per se immune from a defamation
action:" While humor is often a form of criticism or social commentary,78
one cannot escape liability for "murder[ing] another's reputation in
jest."1
79
Courts' rejection of the use of a humor meter in determining protection
for a statement is wise. Such a standard would be too subjective; what
Hustler readers find humorous is quite different from what will make
Moral Majority members laugh. Moreover, while most satire contains
some humor, this approach would not suffice to protect satire that either
is more serious or simply falls flat in its attempt at humor. Courts may
consider a piece's humor as one factor in finding that it is satire, but
should never deny it the protection that would be afforded a satirical
statement solely because it lacks humor.
4. The Restatement Approach
The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 566 outlines an approach
for distinguishing fact from opinion under which an opinion is actionable
73. 119 A.D.2d 252, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1986).
74. 119 A.D.2d at 261, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 875. Similarly, the court in Franklin v. Friedman stated
that a magazine's comic strip showing the plaintiff visibly shrinking was "not serious and/or factual."
12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1146, 1147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). By conflating the two terms, this court
failed to realize that much satire is serious but not, except facially, factual. See also Myers v. Boston
Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 342, 403 N.E.2d 376, 380 (1980) (stating that satiric jokes of per-
former could not be called "attempts to persuade"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, at § 566 comment
d (calling non-defamatory a statement of "good-natured fun, not intended to be taken seriously").
75. 97 Misc. 2d 346, 350, 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108-09 (1978), rev'd, 77 A.D.2d 501,429 N.Y.S.2d
441 (1980).
76. In Salomone, a parody of a storybook character who lived at the Plaza Hotel depicted the
young girl twenty years later scribbling with pink lipstick on a mirror in the Hotel that the manager,
Mr. Salomone, was a child molester. Mr. Salomone, the real-life manager, filed a libel suit. The court
left it to the jury to determine whether the words constituted "nonactionable humor or compensable
libel." 97 Misc. 2d at 352, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 110. Interestingly, the Salomone court excepted from its
protection a statement intended to be funny but not found by its readers to be so. 97 Misc. 2d at 351,
411 N.Y.S.2d at 109-10. Although the plaintiff's claim was ultimately dismissed for the absence of a
showing of actual malice or reputational harm, the appeals court did not disturb the lower court's test.
77 A.D.2d 501, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441.
77. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1413 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
affd, 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Polygram Records v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d
543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1985) and Frank, 119 A.D.2d 252, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869); see also R. SACK,
supra note 14, at 65-66 (humor gives rise to causes of action).
78. Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 552-53, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258; R. SACK, supra note 14, at
239. See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1947) ("What is one man's amusement,
leaches another's doctrine.").
79. Frank, 119 A.D.2d at 257, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (citing Donoghue v. Hayes, Hayes Irish
Exchequer Rep. 265, 266 (1831)).
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only if it implies the allegation of nondisclosed defamatory facts as the
basis for the opinion. For example, if A writes to B, "I think C is an
alcoholic," a jury might find the statement an expression of opinion but
also one which implies that A knows undisclosed facts to support her
opinion.80 The problem for satire lies in its presentation of a front of mak-
ing factual assertions, even though those assertions are not actually be-
lieved. For example, the court in Hustler might have found liability under
the Restatement test because the piece could be understood to imply that
Flynt knew something about Falwell's private life that the reader does not
know."1 However, liability would be inappropriate, since it is unlikely
that the readers of the satire would believe the truth or even existence of
such undisclosed facts."2
As the discussion above illustrates, fictions, hyperbole, allegories,
cartoons, epithets, fantasies and comedy are protected by current doctrine,
but realistic satires about public figures, which function as political
speech, remain vulnerable to libel claims.83 Courts should develop a more
coherent approach to protect satire as opinion.
80. RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, at § 566 comment c, illustration 3; see also Killington Ltd. v.
Times Argus, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1314, 1316 (Vt. Super. Ct. 1987) (using Restatement test to
distinguish between "pure" opinion on one hand and "mixed" opinion-that based on facts not stated
in communication or assumed to exist by parties to communication-on other). The court in Ollman
v. Evans remarked that the Restatement test is both unnecessary, because the factors of textual lan-
guage and verifiability perform the same function, and inadequate, because a statement can be under-
stood as opinion even where no facts are disclosed. 750 F.2d 970, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
81. Reverend Falwell indeed argued that the Hustler parody should be actionable because it
failed to disclose the facts underlying the opinion. Brief for Respondent, supra note 32, at 38-39.
82. The Restatement view may be useful for textual examination of satire; see infra notes 101-11
and accompanying text, if it is underscored that the underlying message is being examined, not the
factual assertion on the face of the text, see infra note 111, and that in the case of public figures, the
facts upon which opinions are based are generally known, see Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380
Mass. 336, 341, 403 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1980); Killington, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1316. The
Restatement view, however, still would slight the reader's interpretation of the statement.
83. The recent case of Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, 668 F. Supp. 1408 (C.D. Cal. 1987), affd,
867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989), exemplifies the confusion courts face in applying the New York Times
rule and the opinion privilege to political satire. Andrea Dworkin, a widely-known feminist, sued
Hustler Magazine for its publication of a series of sexually explicit lampoons of her political views
and personal conduct. In an effort to protect these satires of a public figure, the court used language
from each of the standards outlined. The court also expressed uncertainty about whether the various
tests were applicable to a determination of defamatory content or opinion, and cited the confusion of
various courts as to the relation between the two standards. Id. at 1414 & n.7. The Dworkin lampoon
may be distinguished from protected political speech, however, if it is considered pornography. The
countervailing interest of protecting the safety of women who are victimized by pornography, see
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 323-35 (1986); Public
Hearings on Ordinances to Add Pornography as Discrimination against Women, Minneapolis City
Council, Gov't Opers. Comm. (Dec. 12-13, 1983), and the goal of promoting sex equality, see A.
DWORKIN & C. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S
EQUALITY (1988), may outweigh the speech value of pornography. Moreover, this pornography may
be closer to false fact than opinion, and hence may not warrant protection as political speech. Using
an approach somewhat analogous to the actual reader test proposed in this Note, see infra notes
118-19 and accompanying text, Catharine MacKinnon and Penelope Seator have argued that actual
consumers of porn believe its underlying statement to be that all women desire to be raped, and
believe that statement as fact rather than opinion. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellant at 10, 13, Dworkin, 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-6393) (citations omitted).
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III. SATIRE AS PROTECTED OPINION
A. The Role of the Reader in Hermeneutics
In developing a standard for identifying material that will fall into the
protected satire category, hermeneutics is a useful tool. Because herme-
neutics illuminates our cultural assumptions about meaning, it can ex-
plain how we derive meaning from texts. It can shed light on why the
New York Times rule developed as it did. More importantly, the discipline
of hermeneutics explores the processes that properly ought to be used to
derive meaning. New trends in hermeneutics can therefore serve as a
guide in shaping a new understanding of the opinion privilege.
Traditional hermeneutics, which centered on interpreting the Bible, at-
tempted to recapture the meaning placed in a text by the author. 4 Inter-
pretation represented an endeavor to recreate the original creative act; it
used the text as a means for communicating with the original writer.85
The New York Times test utilizes the three elements that are the subject
of debate in hermeneutics-text, reader, and author" 6-but in line with
the traditional approach, concentrates on authorial intent. Courts applying
the standard examine the text to determine whether the material is a false
statement of fact, and examine the reader's-or the microcosm of society,
the judge and jury's-interpretation, asking whether the text is under-
stood by audiences as defamatory; but the crux of New York Times, the
actual malice rule, looks to authorial intent.
Modern hermeneutists, however, increasingly have looked to the subjec-
tive understanding of the reader.8 7 These theorists maintain that there is
no objective way to explicate either a text's meaning or its author's intent,
but rather that any such identification is made subjectively by a reader.
84. J. BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 12 (1980).
85. See id. at 14.
86. This debate has been echoed in legal circles recently in discussions of how to read the Consti-
tution. Former Attorney General Edwin Meese decries "pouring new meaning into old words," and
instead looks to "[tihe text of the document and the original intention of those who framed it [for] the
judicial standard in giving effect to the Constitution." E. Meese, Speech before the American Bar
Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST SoCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTER-
PRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1, 1, 10 (1986). Justice Brennan, by contrast, points to the
modern reader as the locus for finding the current meaning of the Constitution: "Like every text
worth reading, [the Constitution] is not crystalline . . . . This ambiguity of course calls forth inter-
pretation, the interaction of reader and text. . . . We current Justices read the Constitution in the
only way that we can: as Twentieth Century Americans." W. Brennan, Speech to the Text and
Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST SOcIETY, supra, at 11, 17. See
also Powell, supra note 18, at 889-923 (exploring conflicting hermeneutic traditions that lent back-
drop to drafting of Constitution).
87. Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of the "fusion of horizons" represents one aspect of
this movement toward increased subjectivity; for Gadamer, interpreting a text is a dialogue between
reader and text, rather than a search into the author's intent. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
358 (1975). Perhaps Justice Brennan's point that the "right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from
the sender's First Amendment right to send them" is also a reflection of this trend. Board of Educa-
tion v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1983) (emphasis omitted). But see E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN
INTERPRETATION 26 (1967) ("the only compelling normative principle. . . is the old-fashioned ideal
of rightly understanding what the author meant").
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Accordingly, many theorists no longer take the text or authorial intent to
be constitutive of meaning, but instead focus on the audience's interpreta-
tion of the text."' Professor Stanley Fish identifies the community of read-
ers as the body responsible for determining how we read, understand, and
interpret a text, and thus, what the text means.8 9 Contemporary legal doc-
trine should reflect this shift in identifying the locus for meaning.
B. The Satire Test
A proper test for the satire exemption would be fashioned on the three
traditional elements of interpretation utilized in New York Times, but
modified to reflect the lessons of contemporary philosophical and literary
hermeneutic theory. The focus therefore would shift from authorial intent
to the readers' understanding of the work's message. This approach is
particularly apt for libel law, since defamation is only meaningful in
terms of the community's perception of an individual's reputation.90 By
using audience reaction to determine whether to apply the opinion privi-
lege, courts could resolve the believable/believed dilemma: Only state-
ments believed by the audience as fact would be subject to liability.91
In determining whether a potentially libelous statement falls under the
satire category of protected opinion, courts should begin by examining the
text in its context and ask, first, is it satire? Second, did the author intend
for the piece to be satire? Third, and most important, did audiences un-
88. Professor James Boyd White calls for "the idea of an interaction between mind and text."
J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 18 (1984). According to White, the role of the
reader is especially pronounced in interpreting satire: Swift's A Tale of a Tub, for example, immerses
the reader "in a crazed and impossible world in which he has to make his own way. . . . The
ultimate meaning of this text thus literally is the person the reader makes himself as he responds to
it." Id. at 115. Even Professor Wayne Booth, who takes a more traditional approach-calling autho-
rial intent the "court of final appeal," W. BOOTH, supra note 12, at 11-relies on the reader when he
describes how the meaning of irony and, implicitly, other forms of satire, is formed: "[T]he reader will
find himself choosing . . . to accept or reject the pose, or stand . . . . But irony dramatizes this
choice, forces us into hierarchical participation, and hence makes the results more actively our own."
Id. at 41.
89. "[lt is interpretive communities, rather than either the text or the reader, that produce mean-
ings and are responsible for the emergence of formal features." S. FISH, supra note 18, at 14. Profes-
sor Robert Cover discusses the role that readers in communities play in developing the proliferation of
meanings for law. Cover, supra note 18, at 15, 17 n.47, 42. Justice Brennan, in consonance with
Fish's theory, identifies the role of the community of readers in establishing meaning: "My relation to
this great text is inescapably public. . . . When Justices interpret the Constitution they speak for
their community, not for themselves alone. . . . [Ilt is, in a very real sense, the community's interpre-
tation that is sought." W. Brennan, supra note 86, at 13-14.
90. One article has noted the inappropriate intent focus of the actual malice test for libel, but does
not develop the reader approach for the opinion privilege and even calls the fact/opinion distinction
"trivial." Bezanson & Ingle, Plato's Cave Revisited: The Epistemology of Perception in Contempo-
rary Defamation Law, 90 DicK. L. REv. 585, 606-07 (1986).
91. Before the opinion privilege was constitutionalized, a 1949 Harvard Law Review Note advo-
cated relying on the reader to distinguish between fact and fair comment, but only developed the
standard in the most general sense: "If a substantial number of readers would understand the state-
ment to rest solely on the opinions of the person making the statement, the statement should be
regarded as comment and should come within the privilege if the matter is one of public interest."
Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1213 (1949).
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derstand it as satire-was it perceived as factual, or was it taken as a
subtle, artistic92 communication of an underlying opinion through the ve-
hicle of seemingly factual assertions? Given the importance of protecting
political satire, a plaintiff should be required to prove that the statement
in question fails all three prongs of the test before liability could attach.93
Before developing the test in greater detail, two objections must be ad-
dressed. First, the reader approach to distinguishing opinion from fact
may be objected to because of its "vagueness. '94 According to this argu-
ment, the reader approach renders the outcome unpredictable by placing
the satirist in the precarious position of guessing how her work will be
received-whether her readers will "get it"-and thereby exercises a chil-
ling effect on satirists.95 Such uncertainty would be particularly problem-
atic for realistic satire and for very dry, sophisticated statements such as
Jonathan Swift's writings, which were believed by some readers.9"
This argument can be met in several ways. First, the proposed test
would protect the satirist even in extreme situations because it includes
authorial intent as one of its three factors. All three elements remain, but
with a shift in emphasis. Second, because the intent examined under the
proposed standard is intent to satirize, rather than intent to falsify as
under the actual malice test, the proposed rule affords greater protection
to satiric material, by definition intentionally false.
A third response to the vagueness argument against the reader ap-
proach is that the writer is herself a member of the community of readers.
Satire is an art form that depends upon shared assumptions between
writer and reader.97 The satirist should not be surprised by her audience's
92. The Supreme Court has held artistic expression to be protected under the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1980). This Note does not dwell on the First
Amendment status of artistic expression, however, since satire about public figures should be protected
as political speech, whether or not it constitutes art. See Polygram Records v. Superior Court, 170
Cal. App. 3d 543, 555 n.14, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 259 n.14 (1985) (degree of artistic merit of work
irrelevant to its protection).
93. Alternatively, if the defendant shows that the statement is satire on the basis of any of the
three grounds, the statement should be protected. The initial burden, however, is on the plaintiff. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, at § 580A comment e (plaintiff has burden of proving actual malice).
94. See Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a
Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEo. L.J. 1817, 1846 (1984).
95. Indeed, it is arguable that the genius of the New York Times test lies in its choice of the author
as the real judge of the statement. Through the intent-based actual malice standard, if an author
thinks her statement is true, she can publish it without fear of liability.
96. See JONATHAN SwiFr A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 51 (D. Donoghue ed. 1971) (citing letter
from John Arbuthnot to Jonathan Swift (Nov. 5, 1726)) ("[A] master of a ship [said] that he was very
well acquainted with Gulliver, but that the printer had mistaken, that he lived in Wapping and not in
Rotherhith. I lent the book to an old gentleman, who went immediately to his map to search for
Lilliput."). The readers of the audience Swift was primarily addressing, however, understood that
Swift's work was satire. Id. at 71-72 (citing DEANE SwiFT, AN ESSAY UPON THE LIFE, WRTINGs
AND CHARACTER OF DR. JONATHAN SwIFr (1755)) (Gulliver's voyage to Lilliput . . . is entirely
political. His meaning. . . is to be found so very near the surface that it would almost be an affront
to the common reason of those who are at all versed in the affairs of the world to offer any further
explication.").
97. "[T]he writer addresses the reader, in part, as someone who shares his problem as a member
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reaction, but should have a sense of what her readers will understand.
Finally, the jury is unlikely to miss the point of the satire under this test
for a similar reason; the jurors will read the statement against the back-
ground of the interpretive assumptions of the reading community. The
jurors should be instructed to view the work not through their own eyes,
but as members of the audience to whom the satire was addressed.9" In
the Hustler case, for example, the jury would be asked to consider
whether actual Hustler readers understood the ad parody as fact or as
satiric opinion. This aspect of the test reduces the possibility that the jury
will misinterpret the satire.
Another objection that might be raised against the proposed test is that
it violates contemporary hermeneutics to consider the text and the author
at all when determining meaning.99 The reader's interpretation, however,
cannot be understood in a vacuum without examining both the text and
the author's intent. Assumptions about both are essential parts of the con-
textual backdrop for reading satire. A court must examine a text in order
to determine how the audience addressed would read that text. The court
must also look to authorial intent, because the reader's interpretation is
based in part upon assumptions about the meaning that the author is try-
ing to convey.' 00
Factor 1: The Text
A definition of satire based on the text may be drawn from literary
criticism of the genre. The seventeenth century English poet John Dryden
took the two essential components of satire to be wit and morality.101 Sat-
of the same culture." J.B. WHrrE, supra note 88, at 281. Professor White sees cultural commonality
as particularly important in the case of satire: "Because humor involves the perception of the incon-
gruous, it also involves the implicit assertion of shared congruities; otherwise it could not be under-
stood." Id. at 121. The importance of shared contexts between author and reader cannot be stressed
enough. See W. BOOTH, supra note 12, at 13, 28, 33 (irony is "communal achievement" that joins
"kindred spirits" through "appeal to assumptions, often unstated, that ironists and readers share");
Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777,
783 (1988) ("[T]he constraints [on interpreting a text] will inhere ...in the cultural assumptions
within which both texts and contexts take shape for situated agents."). Professor Gadamer analyzes
the significance of context through his concept of "horizons"-systems of typical expectations held by
various actors in the reading process that are fused in the constitution of meaning. H. GADAMFR,
supra note 87, at 269-74, 358.
98. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
99. Later "reader-response critics," who deny the possibility of objective texts and indeed objectiv-
ity altogether, might level such a criticism. See READER RESPONSE CRrTCtsM xxv (J. Tompkins ed.
1980).
100. See Fish, supra note 97, at 778 ("Words are intelligible only within the assumption of some
context of intentional production, some already in-place pre-decision as to what kind of person, with
what kind of purposes in relation to what specific goals in a particular situation, is speaking or
writing."). A reliance on authorial intent apart from the reader's perception of that intent is also
important in order to shield the satirist from suit where her statement fails in its attempt to draw
upon context and shared assumptions and is indeed believed as fact.
101. 2 EssAYs OF JOHN DRYDEN 75, 91 (W. Ker ed. 1900). By "wit," the literary critic Alvin
Kernan interprets Dryden to mean "'delight,' 'pleasure,' 'art.'" A. KERNAN, THE PLOT OF SATIRE
7-8 (1965). Because some satire may be artless, see supra note 92, this Note focuses on the sense of
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ire thus can be identified first by the methods it employs; whether in the
form of irony, sarcasm or parody, it is usually humorous, and uses shock-
ing and cruel language. 10 2 It touches on matters often fantastical, but not
unthinkable' 03-improbable but not impossible. Satire uses rhetorical
forms in which reality and appearance constantly shift. 0 4 But, second, it
jokes at serious things.1 05 The moral element of which Dryden wrote is
found in satire's didactic purpose, its effort to effect change." 6
Courts should utilize this analysis in determining whether the textual
elements of a satire are present in a contested statement. First, courts
should examine the methods used in the piece. Does the communication
use distortion, with an element of humor? Second, does the piece convey a
message critical of political or social phenomena? Courts, however, should
examine neither the level of humor achieved"0 7 nor the value of the mes-
sage.'08 First Amendment protection is not limited to statements which are
"constructive" in public debate.'
In examining the text of an allegedly defamatory statement, the totality
of circumstances test also may be useful to courts." 0 Finally, courts should
be careful not to look to the facial, seemingly factual message of a satiric
piece ("Falwell has incestuous relations"), but instead focus on its under-
lying point-the opinion ("Falwell is a hypocrite")." 1
"wit" as "delight," or humor. Cf Frye, The Mythos of Winter: Irony and Satire, in MODERN SATIRE
155-56 (A. Kernan ed. 1962) ("Two things. . . are essential to satire: one is wit or humor founded
on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque or absurd, the other is an object of attack.") (emphasis added).
For a detailed look at the textual clues of irony, one of the forms that satire takes, see W. BOOTH,
supra note 12, at 49-86 (clues include warnings in author's own voice, known errors, conflicts of
facts, style or beliefs, and context).
102. G. HIGHET, supra note 7, at 5, 18, 55-72.
103. Id. at 60.
104. A. KERNAN, supra note 101, at 16-17, 23.
105. Id. at 233.
106. E. BLOOM & L. BLOOM, SATIRE'S PERSUASIVE VOICE 18 (1979); see also G. HIGHET,
supra note 7, at 234, 238 (satire's function is social reform, to cure or execute, to tell truth). It is
because of this characteristic that satire lends itself to political speech.
107. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
108. Some courts and commentators have taken this dangerous approach. See, e.g., Miss America
Pageant v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981); Hustler, Brief for Respondent,
supra note 32, at 21; Comment, Defamation: Problems with Applying Traditional Standards to
Non-Traditional Cases-Satire, Fiction, and "Fictionalization," 11 N. Ky. L. REv. 131, 141-43
(1984).
109. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982). The problem with exam-
ining value is that a valuable contribution in the eyes of some may be vulgar and worthless to others.
110. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text. One commentator, see Note, supra note 94,
advocates conditioning protection for opinion upon the inclusion of cautionary terms such as the dis-
claimer used in Falwell, see supra note 32. While warnings in the author's own voice may indicate
that a statement is opinion, such a "mechanical, bright-line rule" would not suffice in an area where
distinctions are vague and complex. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). Satirists, for example, may distort such clues for effect. See also
Falwell, 805 F.2d at 486 (disclaimer "did not and should not convey upon Flynt some magical immu-
nity from suit"); Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) (writer cannot
escape liability simply by prefacing statement with "I think").
111. First Amendment attorney Robert Sack notes that the opinion privilege is the most promising
means of protecting intentional falsehoods such as humor and fiction, but that courts could defeat the
intended protection by applying the privilege too literally-by looking to the surface message, finding
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Factor 2: The Author's Intent
The actual malice standard is of little value in examining the intent of
satirists, since knowledge of falsity is a defining feature of satire, and
hence is easy for plaintiffs to establish. Common law malice-spite or ill
will-also is unhelpful.112 Nor is it appropriate to ask if the defendant
intended to target the plaintiff; 3 the satirist, as social/political commen-
tator, frequently intends to target individuals and expose their follies.11
Finally, as discussed above, the intent-based test used by the Supreme
Court in Hustler, asking whether a statement can be found to "describe"
facts, also is faulty.
Instead, courts should seek to determine, insofar as is possible, whether
the speaker or author had an intent to satirize: whether she tried to criti-
cize a public figure or event through distortion and humor.11 5 If intent to
satirize is found, even where combined with maliciousness or spite, the
author should not be held liable.
Factor 3: The Reader's Interpretation
Courts have relied inappropriately on the audience's reaction to a po-
tentially libelous statement to determine whether it is an outrageous or a
believable description of actual events. The question of whether the reader
finds the statement defamatory also is not probative, since opinions can be
defamatory. Rather, courts should ask whether the text functions as satire:
an assertion of fact and missing the underlying point of the text. R. SACK, supra note 14, at 246-47.
The importance of this distinction has been recognized by at least one court, see Yorty v. Chandler, 13
Cal. App. 3d 467, 472-74, 91 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712-13 (1970), as well as by theorists in one branch of
hermeneutics, semiotics, which investigates the interaction of signs in the creation of meaning, see J.
FISKE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES 90-91 (1982) (analyzing Roland Barthes' the-
ory distinguishing between first order signification, "denotation," and second order signification,
"connotation").
112. The Supreme Court has rejected the relevance of common law malice. See Hustler, 108 S.
Ct. at 880; Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
281 (1974). Moreover, literary theorists criticize the "biographical approach" to understanding satire,
since satire is not a form of personal attack born of authors' prejudices or their physical, psychic and
social difficulties. A. KERNAN, supra note 101, at 4-5. In any event, it is extremely difficult-if not
impossible-to ascertain the satirist's true motivations. See L. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 15,
241-42, 353-55 (undertaking psychological study of satirists). Freud took the view that no wit is
entirely intentional, but rather derives involuntarily from the unconscious, S. FREUD, JOKES AND
THEIR RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS 167-69 (J. Strachey ed. 1960); similarly, the ancients
thought that art speaks through the artist, see L. FEINBERG, supra, at 4-5.
113. Reverend Falwell, for example, argued that Flynt's desire to "assassinate" his character was
critical. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 3, Hustler and Flynt v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988)
(No. 86-1278).
114. In satire, character assassination is the author's aim. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 881 (satire is
calculated to injure); W. BOOTH, supra note 12, at 28 (satire has victims).
115. Intent should be examined regarding content-the message, or ideational aspect-as well as
matters of presentation, such as the intended genre, tone and audience. The "audience addressed"
aspect of the totality of circumstances test, see supra note 50, recognizes the importance of considering
the author's intentional act of targeting her work for an interpretive community that shares her expec-
tations about genre and hence is likely to understand her work.
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Is it believed, understood literally as a factual assertion, or do its readers
see it as a tongue-in-cheek, critical opinion?116
Jurors, however, must ask themselves not how they view the text, or
how "ordinary readers" would perceive it,' 17 but rather how the actual
readers of such material read and would read the text.' 8 The relevant
audience is one that is literate in the particular type of writing, and that
has certain genre expectations when reading the type of material in dis-
pute.1 9 Only if the plaintiff gives clear and convincing evidence 2 ' that a
substantial number 21 of the actual readers believed the statement as fact
116. The definition of satire developed by literary theorists is helpful in explicating readers' inter-
pretations. Courts should ask whether the reader finds in the publication both the methods of distor-
tion and/or humor, as well as a moral message-a political or social critique. See supra notes
101-106 and accompanying text. Analyses of the process of reading satire also are useful. Theorists
tell us that satire evokes emotions of both amusement and contempt in its recipients. G. HIGHEr,
supra note 7, at 21, 150; see also W. BOOTH, supra note 12, at 10-12 (describing process of reading
irony).
117. Where courts have focused on the readers' interpretation in defamation suits, they have
looked to the "average," "reasonable" or "rational" reader's reaction to statements, rather than the
"actual" reader's "actual" reaction. Saenz v. Playboy Enter., 653 F. Supp. 552, 565 n.2 (N.D. Ill.
1987); see, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (average reader),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 894 (2d Cir. 1976) (ordinary
reader), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). This approach reflects the widely used reasonable person
standard. See W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 32-33 (5th ed. 1984).
118. Juries should be instructed to consider evidence of how the material was in fact received by
its actual audience. Few courts have taken this approach. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l
Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285 (1974) (no evidence that statement was under-
stood by any readers of newsletter to be making factual accusation); Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., 557
F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff labelled by Barron's magazine as "mouthpiece" for Frank
Sinatra; Barron's readers polled as to their understanding of term "mouthpiece"); Reddy Communi-
cations v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936, 947 (D.D.C. 1979) (trademark infringe-
ment case involving parody of plaintiff's service mark; survey evidence brought by plaintiff found
methodologically flawed because it failed to inform interviewees of nature of publication and sur-
rounding text, and "to account for the specific public exposed to EAF publications. Indeed, the...
survey, in all likelihood, did not include one actual reader of EAF publications.") (emphasis added).
The relevant group would be composed of actual readers from the intended audience, not casual
bystanders. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1265
(1981) (product disparagement claim by manufacturer of loudspeaker; "there is no evidence to suggest
that the words used would have any unusual meaning to any particular group, such as audiophiles,
who might have more interest in the Article than the general public"), rev'd on other grounds, 466
U.S. 485 (1984).
The actual reader approach is more appropriate than the reasonable reader standard in the defa-
mation context because the meaning of an allegedly defamatory statement is created by the actual,
particularized reader, not a hypothetical one. See D. MORLEY, THE Nationwide AUDIENCE: STRUC-
TURE AND DECODING 163 (British Film Institute 1980) (empirical study of subcultural groupings
and effect of their particular frameworks and individual readings on meaning formation). This ap-
proach is analogous to arguments for a more subjective understanding of the reasonable person stan-
dard. Cf. Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 10 (1987) (courts should strive to understand perspective of individual and her difference, par-
ticularly where law is concerned to protect minority viewpoints).
119. A reader's interpretation is in part conditioned by what the reader expects to find in the text,
based on her reading of similar texts in the past. See Ollman, 750 F.2d at 983 & n.25 (one factor of
context is "power of. . .genres . . . to influence the audience's view of a statement"); W. BooTH,
supra note 12, at 100 (discussing importance of audience's genre expectations).
120. The actual malice standard requires clear and convincing evidence regarding the author's
intent at trial, see Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511 n.30, as well as at summary judgment, Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Likewise, the satire privilege should require clear and
convincing evidence regarding the readers' interpretation.
121. For a communication to be defamatory, it must prejudice the subject in the eyes of a "sub-
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rather than as satiric opinion, or if the jurors acting as surrogate readers
believe the statement as fact, should liability be permissible. 22
CONCLUSION
Judge Learned Hand once wrote: "It is indeed not true that all ridicule
. . . or all disagreeable comment . . . is actionable; a man must not be
too thin-skinned or a self-important prig." '23 In New York Times and
Gertz, the Supreme Court developed a constitutional standard to protect
critics from libel claims based on mistaken fact or opinion, even where
such opinion is "disagreeable comment." That standard and the various
interpretations of it developed by the courts have proven clumsy and un-
workable when applied to satire. Satire is not adequately protected under
New York Times, which focuses on intent, or under current understand-
ings of the opinion privilege, which focus on the text of the communica-
tion and its context. Courts should recognize a new category for satire
under the opinion privilege. The proposed satire test would utilize, as
does the New York Times standard, all three elements recognized by tradi-
tional hermeneutics as constitutive of meaning-text, authorial intent and
readers' interpretation-but emphasize, in accordance with the develop-
ments of contemporary hermeneutics, the community's interpretation of
the statement as believed fact or as opinion.
stantial and respectable minority" of the community. RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, at § 559 com-
ment e.
122. In establishing the respective roles that the court and jury should play in the process of
making the fact/opinion distinction for satire, the proposed standard should function in a fashion
similar to that used to determine both the fact/opinion dichotomy generally and defamatory content.
In the first instance, these determinations are questions of law for the courts, Ollman, 750 F.2d at 978
(citing Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553 (10th Cir. 1983)) (on fact/opinion); REsTATEMENT,
supra note 57, at § 614 comment c (on defamatory content), and if the meaning of the statement is
found to be ambiguous, it is a question of fact for the jury, Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass.
336, 339, 403 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1980). Using the factors outlined above, the judge would ask, based
on her own interpretation of the allegedly defamatory statement: Could the text be considered satire?
Could the author be said to have intended it to be satire? And could it be understood as satire, or
must it be seen as a factual claim? On summary judgment, the judge might find that the material
clearly is satire and could not reasonably be believed as fact. If the piece is found by the court to be
ambiguous in its believability, however, the determination of whether it is to be protected as satiric
opinion is for the jury to decide, following the actual reader standard proposed in this Note. On
appeal, de novo review would be required, as with the actual malice standard. Bose Corp., 466 U.S.
at 508-11.
123. Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1936) (nevertheless finding
liability for ridicule). Judge Hand used a modified version of the proposed reader test in evaluating
the allegedly defamatory statement in that case. At a luncheon during the time Judge Hand "was
studying the case on appellate review, . . . he pulled the advertisement out of his brief case and
without any comment passed it around the table. As we looked at it we burst into roars of laughter.
'That settles it,' said Judge Hand. 'It's defamatory.'" L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 39
(1978).
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